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TH E D E M IS E  OF TH E  R EC O R D IN G  
A C T  AS A  R U LE  OF PRO PERTY
Robert M. Honea
THE DEMISE OF THE RECORDING ACT 
AS A RULE OF PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
For as long as there have been human beings battles have been fought over ownership o f 
real property. For as long as human beings have been forming civilized societies, rules have 
been adopted for the purpose o f avoiding battles over ownership o f real property.
The basic rules which were adopted in England hundreds o f years ago to deal w ith this 
problem are essentially the same rules we are a ll fam iliar w ith today — i f  it  concerns real 
property, it  has to be in  w riting, it  has to be signed and acknowledged, it  has to be placed in  the 
public record, and, most importantly o f all, the public record is determinative o f title.
The last mentioned item is critical to the goal o f avoiding battles over ownership o f real 
property. The reason the foregoing rules avoid such battles is precisely because everyone agrees 
that the owner reflected in  the public record is the owner, and everyone agrees that everyone can 
rely on the public record to establish the identity o f that owner.
Arkansas became a state on June 15, 1836. In the follow ing years, Arkansas’ legislators 
met and adopted statutes dealing w ith a variety o f issues, to include real property. Included in 
those statutes was a piece o f legislation commonly referred to as the recording act, now codified 
at A.C.A. §14-15-404. The recording act, on its face, says that a recorded instrument controls 
over an unrecorded instrument, absent “ actual notice”  o f the unrecorded instrument.
Although the phrase “ actual notice”  would seem, at firs t glance, to be relatively simple to 
understand, interpret, and apply, the reality is quite the opposite. In  the real world, the phrase 
that is actually applied is “ inquiry notice,”  a phrase which has a vastly different meaning (or not 
— it all depends on what you think “ actual notice”  actually means).
This paper w ill attempt to provide an explanation o f how we got from  “ actual notice”  to 
“ inquiry notice,”  w ill define and describe “ inquiry notice”  to the extent it  is possible to do so, 
and w ill conclude by attempting to state the current rules o f property in  the State o f Arkansas 
w ith respect to how one goes about determining who owns real property.
I. Why Have Rules o f Property?
The Arkansas Supreme Court has answered this rhetorical question eloquently, on 
multiple occasions, beginning in  1840.
“ It  is a ll important to the interest o f society, that the rules o f property 
should be definitely settled, and that they should possess uniform ity and 
consistency. Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840).
“ In  our body o f law there have grown up a number o f rules and principles 
governing the law o f real estate which have become known as “ rules o f 
property.”  W hile it  may be argued that many o f such rules are based upon 
technicalities, it  is nevertheless true that these rules, and the technicalities
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upon which they are based, have come into existence and have been 
continued because o f the ever present need fo r stability and predictability 
in  this fie ld  o f the law. Were this not the case then chaos soon would be 
the result and property values would dim inish in  direct relationship to the 
degree o f instability existing in  the law o f this or any other state as it 
might be applied to real property. Consequently, economic and moral 
necessity have dictated the establishment o f such rules and the technical 
basis o f many o f them. Thus it is that the maintaining o f the integrity o f 
such rules devolves upon this tribunal. General welfare requires a 
continuation o f the observance o f such rules and may in special cases, as 
in  the case at bar, be found to require a decision in  accordance w ith these 
principles even though the court may entertain great sympathy for 
individuals in  a particular situation.”  Kirkham  v. Malone, 232 Ark. 390,
336 S.W. 2d. 46 (1960).
There can be no doubt that the recording act, and the recording system in general, are 
rules o f property. In Peterson v. Simpson, 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W 2d. 720 (1985), the Arkansas 
Supreme Court adopted the Duhig rule as a rule o f property in  the State o f Arkansas. In  reaching 
its decision, the court had the follow ing to say w ith respect to the recording system.
“ In the United States, the recording system is the only method we have for 
keeping track o f the ownership o f mineral rights. The recording system 
only makes available the evidence o f title , evidence which is meaningless 
until interpreted by a title  examiner. Rules like those that comprise the 
Duhig rule exist prim arily to make it  possible for title  examiners to 
interpret the evidence they find in  the recorder’s office. W ithout such 
objective rules o f construction, marketable title , and thus a market in  
mineral rights, would not be possible. The in itia l question faced by a 
court that is dealing w ith a Duhig problem is not whether to fo llow  Duhig 
or some other rule o f construction. The firs t question is whether to set 
aside a ll objective rules o f construction and engage in  a subjective inquiry 
into the meaning o f the deed or [instead] to find  the intent o f the parties 
objectively according to accepted rules o f construction.
The general criteria fo r making this threshold decision are clear.
The goal o f interpretation is finding, i f  possible, the actual intent o f the 
parties. Relevant facts, which are admitted by the parties or are proper 
matters fo r jud ic ia l notice, can be taken into account i f  doing so w ill not 
injure the rights o f subsequent purchasers or undermine reliance on the 
recording system. When, however, fairness to individual parties and 
preservation o f a viable recording system are in  conflict, preservation o f 
the recording system, being more important, must control.”
Returning to the rhetorical question “ why have rules o f property?” , the answer is that 
public policy requires it. I t  is in  the best interest o f a civilized society to have stability and 
predictability in  this fie ld  o f the law.
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II. The Recording Act
In  the fa ll o f 1836 the legislature o f the State o f Arkansas met for the firs t time and 
commissioned the preparation o f a code o f c iv il and crim inal laws, to be considered fo r adoption 
by the general assembly at its next session, in  these terms:
“ That the governor shall appoint, by and w ith the advice and consent o f 
the senate, two competent persons to revise and arrange the statute laws o f 
this state, and prepare such a code o f c iv il and crim inal laws, as, in  their 
opinion, may be necessary fo r the government o f this state, in  accordance 
w ith  the constitution; and the persons so appointed shall make their report 
at the next session o f the general assembly, whether it  be a regular or 
called session.”
Sam C. Roane and W illiam  M cK. Ball, Esquires, were duly appointed by the governor, 
commenced upon their mission, and presented the results o f their work at the October session o f 
the general assembly o f the State o f Arkansas in 1837. “ The statutes so revised and presented, 
were referred to appropriate committees, reported to one or the other house, and passed 
separately, and w ith such amendments as seemed proper.”
A  gentleman named A lbert Pike was assigned responsibility fo r preparing an index to the 
foregoing statutes. A  preface to the statutes prepared by M r. Pike provides interesting reading. 
One o f the topics addressed by M r. Pike in  his preface was the reason why the preparation o f a 
code o f laws was necessary. (The Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas).
“ [I]n  no state was ever such a revision called for, more needful for the 
common weal. Taking the organic law as the basis o f legislation, the 
legislative bodies o f M issouri and Arkansas territories had erected, at 
different times, and under the direction o f diverse architects, an unseemly 
and incongruous superstructure thereon; composed o f statutes, enacted in 
part by the legislature o f each territory, in  part by the legislature o f the 
Louisiana territory, and in  part by the governor and judges o f Arkansas 
territory. The whole edifice, erected in such manner, and under the 
auspices o f legislation so conflicting and inartific ia l, resembled some o f 
those old baronial castles, s till extant in  England, where the gothic mingles 
w ith  the Corinthian, the Doric w ith the Chinese style o f architecture, as 
different ages have added different portions to the heterogeneous 
structure.”
The Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas ran some 966 pages, and included chapters 
for counties, county lines, county seats, courts, judges, and clerks. The Revised Statutes also 
included chapters on conveyances o f real estate, chapter 31, and recorders, chapter 124. W ith 
respect to the last two chapters, everything you would expect to see in a comprehensive 
recording system is reflected in the statutes (in  fact, they are the same statutes we s till use today), 
w ith one notable exception -  what we now refer to as the recording act is nowhere to be seen.
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Instead, the recording act was adopted in  1846, and became effective on December 21, 1846. 
The recording act remains unchanged to this day, and reads as follows:
“ (a) Every deed, bond, or instrument o f w riting affecting the title , in  law 
or equity, to any real or personal property, w ith in  this state which is, or 
may be, required by law to be acknowledged or proved and recorded shall 
be constructive notice to a ll persons from the time the instrument is filed 
for record in  the office o f the recorder o f the proper county.
(b) No deed, bond, or instrument o f w riting fo r the conveyance o f any real 
estate, or by which the title  thereto may be affected in  law or equity, made 
or executed after December 21, 1846, shall be good or valid against a 
subsequent purchaser o f the real estate for a valuable consideration 
w ithout actual notice thereof or against any creditor o f the person 
executing such an instrument obtaining a judgment or decree which by 
law may be a lien upon the real estate unless the deed, bond, or 
instrument, duly executed and acknowledged or proved as required by 
law, is filed  fo r record in  the office o f the clerk and ex o ffic io  recorder o f 
the county where the real estate is situated.”  A.C.A. §14-15-404.
I  have been unable to discover an explanation for why the recording act was not included 
in the original Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas adopted in 1837. Recording acts were 
w ell known at the time. Indeed, in  a case decided in  1855, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
discussed the registry acts o f England and other states at length, Byers v. Engles, 16 Ark. 543 
(1855). Nevertheless, whatever the explanation may be, the reality is that although a ll o f the 
other elements o f a recording system were adopted as the law o f the State o f Arkansas 
contemporaneously w ith statehood, the recording act did not arrive un til 10 years later.
For purposes o f this paper, the recording act may be distilled down to the follow ing:
“ Every...instrum ent...shall be constructive notice to all persons from the 
time the instrument is filed fo r record....”
“ No deed...shall be good or valid against a subsequent purchaser... 
w ithout actual notice.. .unless the deed.. .is filed for record....”
HE “Actual Notice”  and Statutory Interpretation
When I embarked upon this project I  assumed that since the recording act is a statute, and 
since it  is the constitutional responsibility o f the courts to interpret and enforce statutes, and since 
the recording act was adopted in 1846 and has remained unchanged ever since, I  would begin my 
research by finding the firs t case in which the courts interpreted the recording act, and 
specifically the firs t case in  which Arkansas’ courts interpreted the meaning o f the phrase “ actual 
notice.”  What I  found surprised me -  as far as I  can te ll, Arkansas’ courts have never been asked 
to interpret, and have never attempted to interpret, the phrase “ actual notice”  as a matter o f 
statutory interpretation.
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I  w ill discuss in  the next section my conclusions concerning the question o f where 
“ inquiry notice”  comes from, since it is not the end product o f jud ic ia l interpretation o f the 
statutory phrase “ actual notice.”  In  this section I  w ill devote my attention to a hypothetical 
question -  what would happen i f  the courts were ever asked to determine the meaning o f the 
phrase “ actual notice,”  as a matter o f statutory interpretation?
The judicial branch has been interpreting the laws enacted by the legislative branch from 
the time the constitution was adopted to the present. The rules o f statutory interpretation adopted 
and applied by the jud ic ia l branch have been distilled over the years into relatively simple 
terminology, the basics o f which are set forth below.
“ The firs t rule o f statutory construction is to construe the statute just as it  
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in  
common language. We construe statutes so that, i f  possible, every word is 
given meaning and effect. I f  the language o f a statute is clear and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, it  is unnecessary 
to resort to the rules o f statutory interpretation. When a statute is clear, it  
is given its plain meaning, and this court w ill not search fo r legislative 
intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning o f the 
language used.”  Roberson v. P h illip s  County Election Commission, 2014 
Ark. 480,449 S.W. 3d. 694 (2014).
“ A  statute is considered ambiguous i f  it  is open to more than one 
construction. When a statute is ambiguous, this court must interpret it  
according to legislative intent and our review becomes an examination o f 
the whole act. In  reviewing the act in  its entirety, this court w ill reconcile 
provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in  an effort 
to give effect to every part. In  addition, this court must look at the 
legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved.”  
Simpson v. Cavalry SPVI, LLC, 2014 Ark. 363,440 S.W. 3d. 335 (2014).
“ The basic rule o f statutory construction to which a ll interpretive guides 
must yie ld  is to give effect to the intent o f the general assembly. When a 
statute is ambiguous,...we must interpret it  according to the legislative 
intent, and its review becomes an examination o f the whole act. Finally, a 
statute is ambiguous only where it  is open to two or more constructions, or 
where it  is o f such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds 
m ight disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. In ascertaining 
legislative intent, we look to the statutory language, legislative history, 
and other appropriate matters.”  G afford v. A llstate Insurance Company,
2015 Ark. 110,459 S.W. 3d. 277 (2015).
Because this is a hypothetical discussion and it  is d ifficu lt to predict how the Arkansas 
Supreme Court might apply the foregoing rules o f statutory interpretation to the phrase “ actual 
notice,”  I  am going to cheat a little  b it and only look at the question o f statutory interpretation
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from this perspective: is it  possible to read the recording act in  such a way that the phrase “ actual 
notice”  means “ inquiry notice,”  as the latter phrase has been defined by the cases? The 
definition o f inquiry notice, as established by the case law, is as follows:
“A  subsequent purchaser w ill be deemed to have actual notice o f a prior 
interest in  the property i f  he is aware o f such facts and circumstances as 
would put a person o f ordinary intelligence and prudence on such inquiry 
that, i f  diligently pursued, would lead to knowledge o f these prior 
interests. This type o f notice must be enough to excite attention or put a 
party on guard to call fo r an inquiry.”  (Emphasis supplied). K illam  v.
Texas O il &  Gas Carp., 303 Ark. 547, 798 S.W. 2d. 419 (1990).
A t this juncture I  cannot help pointing out that i f  a person is “ deemed”  to have actual 
notice, then that person, by definition, does not actually have actual notice. The very definition 
o f inquiry notice, as stated by the courts, therefore conclusively establishes that actual notice and 
inquiry notice are two different things. One would therefore th ink that i f  the courts were ever 
asked to address “ actual notice”  as a matter o f statutory interpretation, the courts would conclude 
that actual notice, whatever else it  m ight be, is not inquiry notice.
Continuing w ith my hypothetical question, i f  you place the recording act and the 
foregoing definition o f “ inquiry notice”  side by side, and ask yourself i f  it  is possible to read the 
phrase “ actual notice”  as “ inquiry notice,”  the common sense conclusion is that it  is absolutely 
impossible to interpret actual notice to mean inquiry notice. Applying the basic rules o f statutory 
interpretation confirms the valid ity o f this common sense reaction. The dictionary definitions o f 
actual and notice are as follows:
Actual: Existing in  fact and not merely potentially. Existing in  fact or 
reality. N ot false or apparent.
Notice: Warning or information o f something
It  would seem that there would be little  d ifficu lty  in  giving these words their plain 
meaning and interpreting the statute in  accordance w ith  the dictionary definitions. Certainly it  
would be d ifficu lt to describe these words as ambiguous.
Assuming arguendo it  is possible to find ambiguity in  the statute, the rules o f statutory 
interpretation require that the statute be interpreted in accordance w ith legislative intent. The 
intent o f the legislature in  adopting the recording act is readily apparent. The purpose o f the 
recording act is to provide certainty w ith  respect to ownership o f real property. I t  is a statement 
o f public policy -  in  the words o f the A rkansas Supreme Court: “ It  is all-important to the interest 
o f society, that the rules o f property should be definitely settled, and that they should possess 
uniform ity and consistency.”  Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840). Considering the statute in 
the context o f legislative intent, the conclusion to be reached is, once again, that actual notice 
means actual notice, not what might be known or could be known or should be known.
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The logical conclusion to be drawn from  the foregoing discussion is that i f  the Arkansas 
Supreme Court were asked to interpret the recording act in  a vacuum, ignoring all o f the case law 
concerning inquiry notice, and looking only at the statute itself, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
would conclude that actual notice means actual notice — not what a person could know, might 
know, or should know, but what the person actually knows. Certainly, you would not expect the 
Arkansas Supreme Court to look at the four comers o f the act and conclude that actual notice 
does not mean actual notice, it  means inquiry notice.
IV . I f  “ Inquiry Notice”  Is N ot the Product o f Judicial Interpretation o f the Phrase “ Actual
Notice,”  Then What Is It?
The recording act says that once a document is recorded in the deed records, it  is 
“ constructive notice”  to everyone from  the time it  is recorded. Makes sense — what is the point 
o f a recording system, i f  you are not charging everyone w ith  knowledge o f everything that has 
been recorded?
The statute also says that a recorded instrument beats an unrecorded instrument absent 
“ actual notice”  o f the unrecorded instrument. Again, makes sense -  it just wouldn’t  be right for 
someone who knows the whole story to prevail over the party who was firs t in  time.
What about “ inquiry notice?”  The statute does not say anything about “ inquiry notice,”  
yet the case law is replete w ith  discussion and application o f inquiry notice, to the point that the 
concept o f actual notice which appears in  the statute is, for all practical purposes, rendered 
meaningless. Where in  the world does inquiry notice come from?
The answer is that inquiry notice has nothing to do w ith the recording act. Rather, it  is 
purely judge made law (common law) which existed before the recording act was adopted, and 
which has continued to be applied to the present day, w ithout regard to the recording act.
In  1841, five years before the recording act was adopted, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
decided the case o f Porter v. Clements, 3 Ark. 364 (1841), a case involving a dispute over the 
ownership o f slaves. Clements needed money and had four slaves that were worth about 
$1,500.00. Clements cut a deal w ith Ph ill ips pursuant to which Phillips gave Clements $400.00 
and Clements gave Phillips a b ill o f sale fo r the slaves. The b ill o f sale, on its face, purported to 
convey the slaves unconditionally. Phillips then assigned the b ill o f sale to Porter. Clements 
later asserted that he actually pawned the slaves to Phillips -  stated differently, Clements took 
the position that the “ deal”  was that i f  Clements would give Phillips $500.00 w ith in  two and one- 
ha lf years, he would get the slaves back, otherwise Phillips got to keep them. Before the two and 
one-half years passed, Clements tendered the $500.00 to Porter and asked fo r the return o f the 
slaves. Porter took the position that the b ill o f sale was absolute on its face, that he did not have 
any actual notice o f the “ deal”  asserted by Clements, that he was an innocent purchaser, and that 
he therefore owned the slaves.
Drawing an analogy to the topic presently under discussion, the b ill o f sale would be 
record title , and the “ deal”  would be the unrecorded instrument.
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Porter lost the case, not because there was any proof that he had actual notice, but rather 
because the court found that Porter had knowledge o f facts which put him on inquiry, and that i f  
he had conducted a diligent inquiry, he would have learned about the “ deal.”  In  reaching its 
conclusion, the court discussed the distinction between inquiry notice and actual notice in  these 
terms:
“ ...and it  is equally as d ifficu lt to define w ith precision the rules which 
regulate implied or constructive notice; fo r it depends upon a ll the varied 
circumstances o f the case, and whether there has been an exercise o f 
ordinary diligence and understand in  making inquiries. Suspicion o f 
notice is not sufficient; there must be clear and strong circumstances, in  
the absence o f actual notice.”  (Emphasis supplied).
Before the recording act was adopted, the courts applied these same jud ic ia l concepts to 
transactions involving real property. In  1853, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f 
Ringgold v. Waggoner, 14 Ark. 69 (1853), a case involving events that occurred in  1844, prior to 
the adoption o f the recording act. In  that case John Waggoner, who was then in  financial straits 
and being vigorously pursued by creditors, conveyed a piece o f land to a relative, Edmond P. 
Waggoner, who then sold the land for the fu ll market value to Edwin T. Burr. The creditors o f 
John Waggoner filed suit, asserting that the conveyance from  John Waggoner to Edmond P. 
Waggoner was a fraudulent conveyance, and arguing that the subsequent conveyance from 
Edmond P. Waggoner to Edwin T. Burr should be set aside on the ground that Edwin T. Burr 
knew or should have known that the conveyance to Edmond P. Waggoner was a fraudulent 
conveyance. Burr defended on the ground that he was entitled to be protected as an innocent 
purchaser. The court held against Burr, finding that even i f  Burr did not have actual notice that 
the conveyance was fraudulent, he had inquiry notice that the conveyance was fraudulent.
“ ...he had sufficient notice to have put him  on enquiry as a man o f 
ordinary prudence and experience in  business transactions; and when the 
means o f information are afforded to a party, he w ill not be allowed to 
protect him self by the want o f notice, because he did not choose to be 
informed.”
The recording act is not mentioned in the decision.
One year later the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f Hardy v. Heard, 15 Ark. 
184. In  that case Rogers, who then held title  to the W/2 o f the NE/4, entered into an agreement 
w ith Montgomery to sell one acre on a bond for title  (what we would today call a contract o f sale 
or a contract for deed). Nothing was recorded, but Montgomery went into possession.
In  1848, Rogers executed and recorded a deed conveying the W/2 NE/4 to Hardy, 
reserving “ ...a ll pieces and parcels o f land granted, bargained, and sold to sundry persons...in 
one and two acre lo ts ....”  In  1849, a judgment was levied on Montgomery’s interest in  the one 
acre, and it  was sold at an execution sale to Heard and Sloan. Heard and Sloan paid o ff the 
remaining balance due Rogers, and obtained a quitclaim  deed fo r the one acre from Rogers. 
Heard and Sloan then sued Hardy, seeking to quiet title  to the one acre.
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The court concluded Hardy had inquiry notice o f the executory bond for title , and 
therefore took subject to the bond fo r title .
“ ...[Hardy] would have to be held chargeable w ith  notice o f the prior 
rights o f Montgomery, on the principle, now universally admitted, that 
whatever is sufficient to put a purchaser on enquiry, in  considered as 
conveying notice. [Citations omitted.] This is sometimes called 
constructive notice, or notice in  law, and which is no more than evidence 
o f notice, the presumption o f which is so violent, that it  cannot be suffered 
to be controverted. [Citations omitted.]
Once again, the recording act is not mentioned in  the decision.
In  1855, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f H am ilton v. Fowlkes, 16 Ark. 
340 (1855). Although the case was decided after the enactment o f the recording act, a ll o f the 
relevant events occurred well before 1846. Although the case does not mention the recording 
act, it  nevertheless applies the same substantive legal concepts as are embodied in the recording 
act:
“ Though the agreement was not upon the public records o f the county 
where the land was situated, yet, i f  Fowlkes became the incumbrancer or 
purchaser thereof, w ith  notice o f the agreement, it  is w ell settled that he is 
bound thereby. On the other hand, it  is equally w ell settled, that i f  he was 
an innocent incumbrancer or purchaser, fo r a valuable consideration, in 
good faith, w ithout notice o f the agreement, he is in  no way to be bound, 
nor is he to be prejudiced thereby. These are fam iliar rules o f law, 
requirinp no reference to authority to sustain them.”  (Emphasis supplied).
The court discussed notice in  the follow ing terms:
“ M r. Kent says: it  is indeed d ifficu lt to define, w ith  precision, the rules 
which regulate implied or constructive notice, fo r it  depends upon the 
in fin ite ly varied circumstances o f each case. The general doctrine is that 
whatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts, in  judgment o f law, to notice, 
provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in  the case o f purchasers and 
creditors, and would lead to the knowledge o f the requisite fact by the 
exercise o f ordinary diligence and understanding.”
The court then went on to discuss the relationship between notice and actual possession:
“ .. .where a person is in  open and actual possession o f land, even though 
he claimed by an equitable title , that possession is sufficient to put a 
subsequent purchaser upon inquiry, as to the actual rights, and the nature 
o f the claim o f such occupant; and is constructive notice o f the nature and 
extent o f those rights.”
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Byers v. Engles, 16 Ark. 543 (1855) is the firs t reported decision I  was able to find 
applying the recording act to events which occurred after 1846. In Byers, Harvey Engles held 
record title  to a tract o f land. A  judgment was entered against Engles, and the property was sold 
at a sheriff’ s sale to Byers. John Engles then sued, presenting an unrecorded deed from Harvey 
Engles to John Engles, and asserted that the judgment sale was a nu llity , as Harvey Engles had 
conveyed the land to John Engles before the judgment lien attached.
The case quotes the recording act verbatim, then goes into a lengthy discussion o f the 
history o f recording acts and the evils recording acts are intended to eliminate. The court then 
went on to find  that John Engles was in actual possession o f the land at a ll times relevant to the 
litigation, that actual possession is equivalent to “ registry notice,”  and that Byers was therefore 
“ deemed”  to have knowledge o f the unrecorded conveyance from  Harvey Engles to John Engles.
The case does not discuss the definition o f “ actual notice”  as that phrase is used in  the 
recording act, and does not recognize that there is any possibility o f a contradiction between the 
statutory phrase “ actual notice”  and the jud ic ia lly  created concept o f “ inquiry notice.”
I  have expended a good deal o f energy reviewing recording act cases from  the 1840’s to 
the present. The cases routinely apply inquiry notice to recording act cases, repeatedly reciting 
words to the effect that a person is “ charged w ith  notice o f ’ or is “ deemed to have notice of" 
anything that might have been discovered upon inquiry (and expanding what, exactly, is 
sufficient to put a person “ on enquiry” ). I  have not found a single case, however, which 
addresses the apparent conflict between the statutory phrase actual notice and the jud ic ia l phrase 
inquiry notice. Specifically, I  have been unable to find a single case addressing this issue as a 
matter o f statutory interpretation -  what did the legislature intend when it adopted the recording 
act, and said a recorded instrument beats an unrecorded instrument, absent “ actual notice” ? 
What does the statutory phrase “ actual notice”  actually mean?
V. Black’s Law Dictionary
I f  the foregoing discussion has not been sufficient to give you a headache, the lengthy 
definition o f “ notice”  in  B lack’s Law Dictionary is sure to give you one. The definition is too 
long to quote here, so a copy is attached as an exhibit to this paper. M y only comment here is 
that the Black’s Law Dictionary definition o f “ notice”  is as schizophrenic as the foregoing 
discussion — as I  read the definition, Black’ s Law Dictionary says that the phrase actual notice 
may mean either actual notice or inquiry notice or both.
“ Actual notice has been defined as notice expressly and actually given, 
and brought home to the party directly. The term “ actual notice,”  
however, is generally given a wider meaning as embracing two classes, 
express and im plied....”
I am not sure what to make o f the Black’s Law Dictionary definition. It can be read as 
either supporting the proposition that “ actual notice”  means actual knowledge, or it  can be read 
as supporting the proposition that “ actual notice”  means inquiry notice.
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V I. Public Policy vs. The Judicial D efinition -  Is I t  Time For A  Legislative Solution?
The jud ic ia l definition is founded upon equitable considerations -  the do-right rule. The 
jud icia l definition seeks to achieve the m orally right result in  every case. The de facto result, as 
a matter o f public policy, is that the importance o f rules o f property, and specifically the 
recording act, is subordinated to the societal need to achieve the “ right”  result in  every case. The 
public policy underlying rules o f property is exactly the opposite -  the societal need fo r stability 
in  this area o f the law outweighs the importance o f achieving the “ right”  result in  every single 
case.
As we sit here today, the public policy o f the State o f Arkansas is the jud ic ia lly  created 
one -  the needs o f the one outweigh the needs o f the many. As Tom D aily once to ld  me, the 
word “ actual”  in  the recording act is as silent as the p in  psoriasis. The question then becomes 
whether this should remain the public policy o f the State o f Arkansas, or i f  instead the legislature 
should alter this state o f affairs by amending the recording act so that it  accomplishes the public 
policy goals underlying rules o f property -  the societal needs o f the many outweigh the needs o f 
the few in this area o f the law.
I f  you agree that a change is needed, the legislative solution would be a simple one — 
substitute “ knowledge”  for “ notice” :
“No deed...shall be good or valid against a subsequent purchaser... 
w ithout actual knowledge.. .unless the deed is filed  fo r record....”
V II. So Where Does A ll o f This Leave Us?
Although it  would be wonderful fo r a ll o f us to get in  the magic way back machine and 
create a world in  which actual notice means actual knowledge, it  is not going to happen absent an 
amendment to the statute. The jud icia l concepts o f inquiry notice have been repeated and 
enforced and extended to the point that they are now, in and o f themselves, a rule o f property. 
Stated differently, although never directly addressing the issue, as a practical matter the courts 
have defined “ actual notice”  to mean “ inquiry notice.”  We are therefore le ft w ith the conclusion 
that the actual notice o f the recording act is useless, and that the governing rule o f property in  the 
State o f A rkansas is judge made law — inquiry notice.
What does inquiry notice mean? The definition has been stated and repeated in  multiple 
decisions. A  good example is the follow ing statement from  K illam  v. Texas O il and Gas Corp., 
supra:
“ A  subsequent purchaser w ill be deemed to have actual notice o f a prior 
interest in  the property i f  he is aware o f such facts and circumstances as 
would put a person o f ordinary intelligence and prudence on such inquiry 
that, i f  diligently pursued, would lead to knowledge o f these prior 
interests. This type o f notice must be enough to excite attention or put a 
party on guard to call fo r inquiry.”
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Turning to the cases themselves, the fo llow ing is an illustrative (but I  am sure by no 
means exhaustive) summary o f specific factual situations in  which the courts have concluded the 
evidence was sufficient to place a prospective purchaser on inquiry notice.
Actual possession. Anyone buying a piece o f real property is deemed to know who is in  
actual possession o f the property. Walls v. Humphries, 2013 Ark. 286, 428 S.W. 3d. 517 (2013).
Taxes. A  prospective purchaser is charged w ith  knowledge o f the identity o f a ll parties 
who are assessing or paying taxes. K illam  v. Texas O il &  Gas Corporation, supra.
Statements in  recorded instruments in  the chain o f title . See, for example, Ham ilton v. 
Fowlkes, supra, where the court held that a deed which conveyed the W /2 NE/4 reserving “ .. .a ll 
pieces and parcels o f land granted, bargained, and sold to sundry persons... in  one and two acre 
lots....”  was sufficient to create inquiry notice.
Reformation. A  party who is considering purchasing a tract o f real property must 
recognize that it  is always possible someone w ill bring an action for reformation, and establish 
that a recorded instrument means something other than what it  says (for example, a mineral 
reservation that does not appear on the face o f the recorded deed). M auldin v. Snowden, 2011 
Ark. App. 630, 386 S.W. 3d. 560 (2011).
Imperfect title. “ One who purchases from  a grantor who does not have an apparently 
perfect record title  is not a bona fide purchaser fo r value without notice.”  Phelps v. Justiss O il 
Company, 291 Ark. 538, 726 S.W. 2d. 662 (1987). Seriously? I  do not believe I  have ever seen 
“ an apparently perfect record title ”  in  a ll o f the years I  have been reading title . I f  you take this 
language at face value, and consider it  in  the ligh t o f the reality that record title  in  the State o f 
Arkansas is rarely perfect, this case says that there is no such thing as a recording act in  the State 
o f Arkansas.
W ild  deeds. W ild deeds are inquiry notice. K illam  v. Texas O il &  Gas Corporation. 
Think about that one fo r a minute. You are reading an abstract which actually has a perfect 
chain o f title , unbroken from  patent to the present day, no blemishes o f any kind. You also have 
what appears to be a w ild  deed, in  which the parties to the instrument do not appear anywhere in 
the perfect record title . K illam  says that the w ild  deed is nevertheless inquiry notice o f an 
unrecorded instrument. Certainly far afield from  anything resembling “ actual notice.”
Legal descriptions. In  Rice v. Welch M otor Company, 95 Ark. App. 100, 234 S.W. 3d. 
327 (2006), one o f the calls in the recorded deed was “ thence northerly along flood line o f lake 
about 110 feet to center o f the valley to the D.D. Glover lo t corner.”  The court held that the 
foregoing was sufficient to constitute inquiry notice o f a previously executed but subsequently 
recorded deed from the common grantor to D.D. Glover, which overlapped this deed by 
approximately 15 feet.
You have to assume anything the seller tells you is a lie. In  Woods v. W right, 254 Ark. 
297, 493 S.W. 2d. 129 (1973), the seller had entered into an unrecorded contract o f sale in  1966. 
In 1969 he sold the property to a th ird  party. In  connection w ith  that transaction, he told the third
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party about the unrecorded contract o f sale, but represented to the third party that the purchaser 
had defaulted and that the contract was cancelled. It turned out this statement was false. The 
court concluded that the third party should have questioned the veracity o f the seller’s statement 
and inquired directly o f the purchasers as to the status o f the contract.
Common grantor. In  Brewer v. Fletcher, 210 Ark. 110, 194 S.W. 2d. 668 (1946) the 
first, unrecorded instrument was a timber deed. The second, recorded conveyance was a 
certificate o f purchase at a tax sale. The court there said that the unrecorded timber deed 
prevailed, on die ground that “ The said statute refers to subsequent purchasers from  the common 
grantor,”  and the parties did not acquire their interests from a common grantor. I  cannot explain 
this one. I t  isn’t  really an inquiry notice case, but it does serve to illustrate the extent to which 
the courts have emasculated the recording act. The parties were clearly asserting claims through 
a common grantor, and in any event the statute says no such thing.
Adverse possession. Assume you do not have a perfect record title , but at the same time 
you have what appears to be perfect adverse possession title . The Arkansas Supreme Court says 
too bad, so sad -  recording is irrelevant. In  Taylor v. Scott, a mineral deed conveying an 
undivided one-half interest in  minerals was executed in  1937 by the person who then held record 
title . In 1938, the person who was in actual possession executed a deed to a subsequent purchaser 
fo r value. The subsequent purchaser went into possession, assessed and paid taxes, and clearly 
established adverse possession title . The unrecorded mineral deed was fina lly  recorded in  1956. 
The court said that the unrecorded mineral deed won, w ithout even discussing inquiry notice, on 
the ground that the recording act does not apply to subsequent purchasers o f adverse possession 
title  rather than record title .
“ When a lawyer examines an abstract o f title  and finds that the apparent 
owner’s title  rests only on adverse possession, a rare situation, he is at 
once on notice that there may be flaws in  the title ....”  Taylor v. Scott, 285 
Ark. 102, 685 S.W. 2d. 160 (1985).
I  also call your attention to the court’ s comment that title  resting on adverse possession is 
“ a rare situation” . The author was evidently not fam iliar w ith  Arkansas title .
Tax title. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also held that “ The recording statute benefits 
a subsequent purchaser from  the common grantor, not a purchaser at a tax sale.”  Taylor v. Scott, 
supra, citing as support fo r the statement Brewer v. Fletcher, supra {Brewer v. Fletcher says no 
such thing).
V III. Conclusion
The title  o f this paper suggests that the recording act’ s usefulness as a rule o f property in 
the State o f Arkansas ended recently. The title  is misleading. The truth o f the matter is that the 
usefulness o f Arkansas’ recording act has always been illusory.
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In  the introduction to this paper I stated that I  would conclude by attempting to state the 
current rules o f property in  the State o f Arkansas w ith  respect to how one goes about determining 
who owns real property. I  suggest the follow ing:
1. Examine record title. I f  there is anything in the record title  which is inconsistent 
w ith a “ perfect”  record title , get to the bottom o f it.
2. Compare the record o f tax assessments and tax payments (both surface and 
mineral) w ith  record title . I f  there are any inconsistencies or discrepancies, get to 
the bottom o f it. Note -  since there is always the possibility o f an unrecorded 
mineral deed in  which minerals were severed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court 
says that the severance was effective at the time the deed was executed and 
delivered (Taylor v. Scott, supra), your inquiry into taxes w ill need to extend from 
patent to the present day.
3. Actual possession. Verify the identity o f everyone who has been in actual 
possession, from  patent to the present day. Again, i f  there are any inconsistencies 
or discrepancies between actual possession and record title , get to the bottom o f it.
4. Examine a ll w ild  deeds, track down the parties to a ll w ild  deeds, and verify what 
happened. Note that this is an interesting requirement, given the fact that 
Arkansas is a grantor-grantee index state, and finding a ll w ild  deeds requires that 
you search by legal description.
5. Find and record a ll lost and unrecorded deeds. Again, good luck w ith  this one.
I f  you are able to fu lf ill each o f the fo llow ing requirements, you w ill be as certain as you 
can possibly be that you have accurately identified the true owner. I w ill not, however, te ll you 
that completing each o f the foregoing chores w ill absolutely guarantee you an accurate result. In 
my opinion, the decisions o f the Arkansas Supreme Court have created a situation where the 
public policy reasons underlying rules o f property in  general and the recording act specifically 
have been thrown under the bus, and replaced w ith  a case-by-case analysis o f the equities o f each 
specific situation, resulting in  a nightmare for parties who rely on mineral title  and a cornucopia 
fo r lawyers who make their liv ing  resolving title  disputes.
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N otice. Inform ation; the result o f observation, whether 
by the senses or the mind; knowledge of the existence of 
a fact or state of affairs; the means of knowledge. 
Intelligence by whatever means communicated. Koehn 
v. Central Nat. Ins. Co. o f Omaha, Neb., 187 Kan. 192, 
354 P.2d 352, .358. Any fact which would put an ordi­
na rily  prudent person on inqu iry. State ex re l. Gleason 
v. Rickhoff, Mo.App., 541 S.W.2d 47, 50. That which 
im parts inform ation to  one to be notified. Greene v. 
Ives, 25 Conn.Sup. 356, 204 A.2d 412, 415.
Notice in  its  legal sense is inform ation concerning a 
fact, actually communicated to a person by an autho­
rized person, o r actually derived by him  from a proper 
source, and is ' regarded in  law  as "actual”  when the 
person sought to he affected by i t  knows thereby of the 
existence o f the particu lar fact in  question. United 
States v . Tuteur, C.AHI., 215 F.2d 415. I t  is knowledge 
of facts which would na tura lly lead an honest and 
prudent person to make inqu iry, and does not necessar­
ily  mean knowledge o f a ll the facts. Wayne Bldg. & 
Loan Co. o f Wooster v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St.2d 195, 
228 N.E,2d 841, 847, 40 0.0.2d 182. In  another sense, 
"notice”  means inform ation, an advice, or w ritten  warn­
ing, in  more or less form al shape, intended to apprise a 
person of some proceeding in  which his interests are 
involved, or inform ing him  o f some fact which i t  is his 
rig h t to know and the duty o f the notifying party to 
communicate.
Fed.R. C iv il P. 5(a) requires tha t every w ritten  notice 
be served upon each o f the parties.
A  person has notice o f a fact i f  he knows the fact, has 
reason to know it, should know it, or has been given 
notification o f it. Restatement, Second, Agency § 9.
Notice may be either (1) statutory, i.e., made so by 
legislative enactment; (2) actual, which brings the 
knowledge o f a fact d irectly home to the party; or (3) 
constructive. Constructive notice may be subdivided 
into: (a) Where there exists actual notice of matter, to 
which equity has added constructive notice of facts, 
which an inqu iry  a fte r such m atter would have elicited; 
and (b) where there has been a designed abstinence from  
inqu iry fo r the very purpose o f escaping notice.
See also Adequate notice; Charged; Due notice; imme­
diate notice; Imputed notice; Judicial notice; Knowledge; 
Legal notice; Publication; Reasonable notice.
A ctual notice. Actual notice has been defined as notice 
expressly and actually given, and brought home to the 
party directly. The term  “ actual notice,”  however, is 
generally given a wider meaning as embracing two 
classes, express and im plied; the former includes a ll 
knowledge o f a degree above that which depends upon 
collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party 
the fu rthe r duty o f inqu iry; the la tte r imputes knowl­
edge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of 
having the means of knowledge. In  th is sense actual 
notice is such notice as is positively proved to have been 
given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is 
presumed to have received personally because the evi­
dence w ith in  his knowledge was sufficient to put him 
upon inquiry.
Averment o f notice. The statement in  a pleading tha t 
notice has been given.
Commercial law. A  person has "notice”  o f a fact when: 
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or (b) he has received 
a notice or notification o f it; or (c) from  a ll the facts and 
circumstances known to him  a t the tim e in  question he 
has reason to know tha t i t  exists. A person "knows”  or
has "knowledge”  of a fact when he has actual knowledge 
o f it .  "Discover”  or "learn”  or a word or phrase of 
s im ilar im port refers to knowledge rather than to rea­
son to know. The tim e and circumstances under which 
a notice or notification may cease to be effective are not 
determined by the U.C.C. U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
A  person "notifies”  or "gives”  a notice or notification 
to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably 
required to inform  the other in  ordinary course whether 
or not such other actually comes to know o f it. A  
person "receives”  a notice or notification when: (a) i t  
comes to his attention; or (bj i t  is duly delivered at the 
place of business through which the contract was made 
or a t any other place held out by him  as the place fo r 
receipt o f such communications. U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
Under the U niform  Commercial Code, the law on 
"notice,”  actual or inferable, is precisely the same 
whether the instrum ent is issued to a holder or negotiat­
ed to a holder. Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. 
M e rrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &  Smith, Inc., 296 M inn. 
130, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287.
Constructive notice. Constructive notice is inform ation 
or knowledge o f a fact imputed by law  to a person 
(although he may not actually have it), because he could 
have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his 
situation was such as to cast upon him  the duty o f 
. inqu iring  in to it. Every person who has actual notice o f 
circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon 
inqu iry  as to a particu lar fact, has constructive notice o f 
the fact itse lf in  a ll cases in  which, by prosecuting such 
inqu iry, he m ight have learned such fact.
Constructive "notice”  includes im plied actual notice 
and inqu iry  notice. F. P. Baugh, Inc. v. L ittle  Lake 
Lumber Co., C.A.CaI., 297 F.2d 692, 696.
Express notice. Express notice embraces not only 
knowledge, but also that which is communicated by 
d irect inform ation, either w ritten  or oral, from  those 
who are cognizant of the fact communicated. See also 
A ctual notice, above.
Im plied notice. Im plied notice is one o f the varieties o f 
actual notice (not constructive) and is distinguished from  
"express”  actual notice. I t  is notice inferred or imputed 
to a party by reason of his knowledge o f facts or circum­
stances collateral to  the main fact, of such a character 
as to  put h im  upon inquiry, and which, i f  the inqu iry 
were followed up w ith  due diligence, would lead him  
defin ite ly to the knowledge o f the m ain fact. "Im plied 
notice”  is a presumption o f fact, re lating to what one 
can learn by reasonable inquiry, and arises from  actual 
notice of circumstances, and not from constructive no­
tice. O r as otherwise defined, im plied notice may be 
said to exist where the fact in  question lies open to the 
knowledge o f the party, so tha t the exercise o f reason­
able observation and watchfulness would not fa ll to 
apprise him  of it, although no one has to ld  him  o f i t  in 
so many words.
Personal notice. Communication of notice o ra lly  or in 
w ritin g  (according to the circumstances) d irectly to the 
person affected or to be charged, as distinguished from 
constructive or im plied notice, and also from  notice 
imputed to him  because given to his agent or representa­
tive. See A ctual notice; Express notice, above.
Public notice. Notice given to the public generally, or to 
the entire community, or to a ll whom i t  may concern. 
Such must commonly be published in  a1 newspaper of 
general circulation. See also Publication.
Reasonable notice. Such notice or inform ation o f a fact 
as may fa irly  and properly be expected or required in 
the particu la r circumstances.
